BIA

## STATEMENT OF

## FRANK C. CARLUCCI

## DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION

OF THE

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 5, 1979

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO RESPOND TO YOUR INTEREST IN THE IMPACT PUBLIC DISCLOSURE STATUTES HAVE HAD ON THE MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I INTEND TO BE AS DETAILED AS IS POSSIBLE IN A PUBLIC SESSION AND I AM, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO GO INTO CLASSIFIED MATTERS AND FURTHER DETAIL IN EXECUTIVE SESSION.

AT THE OUTSET, HOWEVER, I WANT TO POINT OUT THAT I AM FACING A REAL DILEMMA IN APPEARING BEFORE YOU TODAY ON THIS SUBJECT. AS MY REMARKS HOPEFULLY WILL MAKE CLEAR, WE DO HAVE PROBLEMS IN OUR COUNTRY IN KEEPING THE AUTHORIZED AND LEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES OF CIA SECRET. SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS ARE-REAL, BUT FOR OTHERS, SUCH AS THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), IT IS ESSENTIALLY A MATTER OF PERCEPTION. I WILL BE TELLING YOU TODAY WHY THAT IS SO. HOWEVER, SINCE WE ARE DEALING WITH PERCEPTION I KNOW AS CLEARLY AS I AM SITTING BEFORE YOU TODAY THAT MY STATEMENTS BEFORE YOU WILL BE USED BY HOSTILE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE POTENTIAL AGENTS THAT COLLABORATION WITH CIA IS INDEED A FOOLHARDY ENDEAVOR BECAUSE INEVITABLY THEIR ACTIONS WILL BE MADE PUBLIC. EVEN SO, I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THIS OPEN SESSION CAN COUNTERACT SUCH ATTEMPTS IF THE END RESULT

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IS AN INCREASED CAPACITY FOR OUR AGENCY AND ITS OFFICERS

TO DEAL WITH INDIVIDUALS AND CONVINCINGLY OFFER THE PROTECTION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WHICH PEOPLE WHO PLACE THEIR

LIFE OR LIBERTY IN JEOPARDY DEMAND.

I ALSO WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ADMIRAL TURNER AND
I SUPPORT THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPENNESS IN GOVERNMENT.
INDEED, ADMIRAL TURNER HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR BRINGING TOO
MUCH OPENNESS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. UNDER HIS
LEADERSHIP APPROXIMATELY 150 FINISHED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
HAVE BEEN DECLASSIFIED PER YEAR AND HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE
TO THE PUBLIC THROUGH THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. WE HAVE MOVED
FROM THE FORMER "NO COMMENT" RESPONSE AND NOW ROUTINELY
PROVIDE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO MEDIA INQUIRIES. WE ARE CONDUCTING A DIALOGUE WITH AMERICAN ACADEMIC
SPECIALISTS, AND INCREASINGLY ANALYTICAL PERSONNEL PARTICIPATE
IN THE PRESENTATION OF UNCLASSIFIED PROFESSIONAL PAPERS. IN
THIS WAY THE SUBSTANTIVE PRODUCT OF CIA IS MADE AVAILABLE AND
CONTRIBUTES TO AN INFORMED PUBLIC WITHOUT RISKING THE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS.

NOR DO WE TAKE ISSUE WITH PUBLIC DISCLOSURE STATUTES AS VEHICLES FOR GIVING CITIZENS GREATER ACCESS TO THE AFFAIRS OF GOVERNMENT AND ASSURING INDIVIDUALS THAT INFORMATION ON THEM, WHICH MAY BE LEGITIMATELY GATHERED BY THEIR GOVERNMENT, IS ACCURATE AND WILL NOT BE ABUSED.

WHAT WE DO QUESTION SERIOUSLY AND THOUGHTFULLY, HOWEVER, IS THE APPROPRIATENESS OF APPLYING GOVERNMENT-WIDE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CONCEPTS TO THE AUTHORIZED AND LEGITIMATE ACTIVI-TIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WHICH REQUIRE SECRECY. INDEED, THE CONGRESS ITSELF HAS RECENTLY REAFFIRMED THE UNIQUENESS OF OUR MISSION AND THE INFORMATION DERIVED FROM IT BY CREATING THIS OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE AND ITS COUNTER-PART IN THE SENATE. AS A RESULT, THERE NOW EXISTS EFFECTIVE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS TO ASSURE THE ACCOUNTABILITY, LEGALITY AND PROPRIETY OF CIA ACTIVITIES WHICH MUST REMAIN SECRET. ADMIRAL TURNER AND MYSELF, AS CONGRESSIONALLY APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES, INSURE THAT THIS COMMITTEE IS NOW AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUPPLIED WITH WHAT-EVER INFORMATION YOU NEED IN ORDER THAT YOU MAY BE SATISFIED THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS FOLLOWING THE LAW AND IN SO DOING EXERCISING GOOD JUDGMENT. YOU, NOT 20,000 FOIA REQUESTERS, FOREIGN AND AMERICAN, ARE THE PROPER PEOPLE TO CONDUCT OVERSIGHT.

IT IS, I SUBMIT, THROUGH THESE COMMITTEES AND THEIR STAFFS, AS WELL AS THE EXTENSIVE EXECUTIVE BRANCH REVIEW MECHANISMS, THAT OVERSIGHT OF THIS NATION'S MOST SENSITIVE ACTIVITIES OUGHT TO BE UNDERTAKEN.

IT IS, OF COURSE, FOR CONGRESS TO DECIDE WHETHER THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE NATION ARE SERVED BY THE APPLICATION

OF GENERAL OPENNESS CONCEPTS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

IT IS OUR POSITION THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE NATION

ARE NOT SO SERVED. MY CENTRAL THEME TODAY, THEREFORE,

IS THAT THE TOTAL APPLICATION OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE STATUTES

LIKE FOIA TO THE CIA IS SERIOUSLY DAMAGING OUR ABILITY TO

DO OUR JOB.

BEFORE I MAKE THIS CASE, ALLOW ME TO MAKE TWO POINTS:

- -- IT IS UNDENIABLE THAT WITHIN THE CURRENT FOIA THERE EXIST SUFFICIENT NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTIONS TO PROTECT OUR MOST VITAL INFORMATION. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY ARE SO PERCEIVED BY THOSE UPON WHOM WE DEPEND TO PROVIDE US, IN ABSOLUTE SECRECY, THAT INFORMATION.
- -- THE DIFFICULTY IN PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
  ARISES FROM MORE THAN THE FOIA. THERE HAVE, FOR EXAMPLE,
  BEEN LEAKS -- WE HAVE HAD LEAKS, THERE HAVE BEEN CASES
  OF ESPIONAGE, FORMER AGENCY EMPLOYEES HAVE WRITTEN BOOKS
  WITHOUT PROPER CLEARANCE BEFOREHAND AND PHILLIP AGEE AND
  OTHERS OF HIS GROUP PUBLISH A MONTHLY BULLETIN DEDICATED TO
  EXPOSING OUR UNDERCOVER EMPLOYEES AND OPERATIONS OVERSEAS.
  WE ARE TRYING TO DEAL WITH ALL OF THESE ISSUES.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT HAS EMERGED AS A FOCAL POINT OF THE OFTEN-HEARD ALLEGATION THAT THE CIA CANNOT KEEP A SECRET, THAT IS, CANNOT PROPERLY PROTECT ITS INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. IT HAS, THEREFORE,

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ASSUMED A LARGER THAN LIFE ROLE AS A SYMBOL OF THIS NATION'S

DIFFICULTY IN KEEPING CONFIDENCES INVIOLATE. I DO NOT AGREE

THAT WE CANNOT KEEP A CONFIDENCE, BUT IT IS THAT PERCEPTION

HELD BY MANY OF THOSE WHO WOULD ONLY ENTER INTO AN ARRANGE—

MENT WITH US ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS THAT IS THE CRUCIAL

ISSUE AT HAND.

IN ORDER TO APPRECIATE THE FOIA'S IMPACT ON INTELLIGENCE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO CLEARLY UNDERSTAND HOW WE OPERATE.

IT IS A MISCONCEPTION THAT OUR PEOPLE SPEND MOST

OF THEIR TIME MOVING AROUND TRYING TO PICK UP INFORMATION

IN BARS AND PHOTOGRAPHING DOCUMENTS WITH SECRET CAMERAS. ACTUALLY

THEIR MISSION IS TO ESTABLISH WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY A CONTRACTUAL

RELATIONSHIP WITH PEOPLE IN KEY POSITIONS WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE

BE INACCESSIBLE TO OUR DIPLOMATS OVERSEAS.

THIS IS NOT AN EASY TASK NOR IS IT QUICKLY ACCOMPLISHED.

THE PRINCIPAL INGREDIENT IN THESE RELATIONSHIPS IS TRUST. TO BUILD A RELATIONSHIP WHICH IN MANY CASES ENTAILS PUTTING ONE'S LIFE AND THAT OF ONE'S FAMILY IN JEOPARDY TO FURNISH INFORMATION TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS A DELICATE AND TIME-CONSUMING TASK. OFTEN, IT TAKES YEARS TO CONVINCE AN INDIVIDUAL THAT WE CAN PROTECT HIM. EVEN THEN THE SLIGHTEST PROBLEM CAN DISRUPT THIS RELATIONSHIP.

RECOGNIZE ALSO THAT MOST OF THOSE WHO PROVIDE US WITH OUR MOST VALUABLE AND THEREFORE MOST SENSITIVE INFORMATION COME FROM SOCIETIES WHERE SECRECY IN BOTH GOVERNMENT AND EVERYDAY LIFE PREVAILS. IN THESE SOCIETIES, OFTEN THOSE SUSPECTED OF ANYTHING LESS THAN TOTAL ALLEGIANCE TO THE RULING PARTY OR CLIQUE MAY BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED FROM THEIR JOBS, INCARCERATED, OR EVEN EXECUTED. IN SOCIETIES SUCH AS THESE, THE CONCEPTS BEHIND THE FOIA ARE TOTALLY ALIEN, FRIGHTENING AND INDEED CONTRARY TO ALL THAT THEY KNOW. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR MOST OF THEM TO UNDERSTAND THE LAW ITSELF MUCH LESS WHY AN ORGANIZATION SUCH AS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WHEREIN REPOSE THEIR MOST GUARDED SECRETS, SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE ACT. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE THEM THAT SOMEDAY THEY WILL NOT AWAKEN TO FIND IN A U.S. NEWSPAPER OR MAGAZINE INFORMATION WHICH THEY HAVE FURNISHED TO THE AGENCY WHICH CAN BE TRACED BACK TO THEM.

HARDLY A DAY GOES BY THAT THERE IS NOT A SENSATIONAL NEWS

ARTICLE DESCRIBING CIA INFORMATION RELEASED UNDER FOIA. THE

FACT THAT MUCH OF IT IS REPETITIOUS AND MOST OF IT IS HISTORY

IS LOST ON OUR AGENT NETWORK.

IMAGINE THE SHACKLES BEING PLACED ON THE CIA CASE OFFICER
WHO MUST EVENTUALLY CONVINCE THE FOREIGN AGENT TO COOPERATE
WITH US. THE MOMENT OF TRUTH FOR THE CASE OFFICER COMES
USUALLY AT THE TIME OF RECRUITMENT. THE AGENT, WHILE LEANING

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TOWARDS COOPERATION, WILL DEMAND THAT HIS INFORMATION BE PROTECTED. HE WANTS ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE THAT NOTHING WILL BE

GIVEN OUT WHICH COULD EVEN CONCEIVABLY LEAD HIS OWN INCREASTINGLY SOPHISTICATED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PEOPLE TO APPEAR AT

HIS DOORSTEP. BUT THE BARRAGE OF INTELLIGENCE DISCLOSURE

IS, MR. CHAIRMAN, MAKING IT HARDER AND HARDER FOR OUR CASE

OFFICERS TO BE CONVINCING.

ALTHOUGH, WHEN ASKED, WE ASSURE THESE INDIVIDUALS THAT
THEIR INFORMATION IS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE WELL PROTECTED,
WE HAVE ON RECORD NUMEROUS CASES WHERE OUR ASSURANCES HAVE
NOT SUFFICED. FOREIGN AGENTS, SOME VERY IMPORTANT, HAVE
EITHER REFUSED TO ACCEPT OR HAVE TERMINATED A RELATIONSHIP
ON THE GROUNDS THAT, IN THEIR MINDS -- AND IT IS UNIMPORTANT
WHETHER THEY ARE RIGHT OR NOT -- BUT IN THEIR MINDS THE CIA
IS NO LONGER ABLE TO ABSOLUTELY GUARANTEE THAT INFORMATION
WHICH THEY PROVIDE THE U. S. GOVERNMENT IS SACROSANCT. AGAIN,
WE BELIEVE WE CAN KEEP IT SO, BUT IT IS, IN THE FINAL
ANALYSIS, THEIR PERCEPTION -- NOT OURS -- WHICH COUNTS.

FOR EXAMPLE, A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE FROM A
COMMUNIST COUNTRY BROKE OFF A PRODUCTIVE ASSOCIATION WITH
US SPECIFICALLY BECAUSE OF FEAR OF THE CONSEQUENCES
OF DISCLOSURE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT. LAST
YEAR HE ALSO FAILED TO USE ESTABLISHED MEANS FOR REVIVING
CONTACT WITH THE AGENCY DESPITE THE ASSET'S RENEWED RESIDENCE

OUTSIDE HIS NATIVE LAND. WE CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT HE IS LOST AS A SOURCE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

THERE ARE OTHER CASES WHERE AGENTS HAVE CITED THE FOIA AS THE REASON FOR UNWILLINGNESS TO EITHER COOPERATE INITIALLY, CONTINUE TO COOPERATE, OR COOPERATE AS FULLY AS IN THE PAST. HOW MANY CASES OF REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WHERE NO REASON IS GIVEN BUT IF KNOWN WOULD BE FOR SIMILAR REASONS, I CANNOT SAY. I SUBMIT, HOWEVER, THAT BASED UPON THE NUMEROUS CASES OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE, THERE ARE MANY MORE CASES OF SOURCES WHO HAVE DISCONTINUED A RELATIONSHIP OR REDUCED THEIR INFORMATION FLOW BASED ON THEIR FEAR OF DISCLOSURE. NO ONE CAN QUANTIFY HOW MUCH VALUABLE INFORMATION IS LOST AS A RESULT.

THE FOIA ALSO HAS HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON OUR RELATION—SHIPS WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. RECENTLY, THE
CHIEF OF A MAJOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SAT IN MY OFFICE
AND FLATLY STATED THAT HE COULD NOT FULLY COOPERATE AS LONG AS
CIA IS SUBJECT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT. IN ANOTHER
CASE, A MAJOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DISPATCHED TO
WASHINGTON A HIGH RANKING OFFICIAL FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE
OF REGISTERING CONCERN OVER THE IMPACT OF THE FOIA ON
OUR RELATIONSHIP. I STRONGLY ARGUED THAT WE HAD ADEQUATE
NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTIONS. WHILE ADMITTING AWARENESS OF THESE
EXEMPTIONS, THIS REPRESENTATIVE NOTED, CORRECTLY, THAT EVEN INFORMA:
TION DENIED UNDER THE EXEMPTION WAS SUBJECT TO LATER REVIEW

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AND POSSIBLE RELEASE BY A U.S. COURT. WHILE THIS HAS

FORTUNATELY NOT YET HAPPENED, I WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO

GUARANTEE THAT IT WILL NOT. THESE ARE BUT TWO EXAMPLES.

THE QUESTION I CANNOT ANSWER IS HOW MANY OTHER SERVICES ARE

NOW MORE CAREFUL AS TO WHAT INFORMATION THEY PASS TO THIS

AGENCY.

FINALLY, IT IS NOT ONLY FOREIGN SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT FEEL THREATENED BY THE FOIA'S APPLICABILITY TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. THE FOIA HAS IMPACTED ADVERSELY ON OUR DOMESTIC CONTACTS AS WELL. AS THE COMMITTEE IS WELL AWARE, PATRIOTIC AMERICANS VOLUNTEER INFORMATION WHICH IS INVALUABLE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. MOST OF THESE AMERICANS, FOR BUSINESS AND OTHER REASONS, INSIST THAT WE PROTECT THE FACT OF THEIR COOPERATION AND THE INFORMATION WHICH THEY PROVIDE.

DESPITE THE UNIVERSAL CONCERN OVER FOIA, MOST AMERICANS
CONTINUE TO HELP US. BUT THERE ARE THOSE WHO, IN ASSESSING
THE RISK OF DISCLOSURE, DETERMINE THAT IT IS NOT IN THEIR
BEST INTEREST TO COOPERATE. THEY FIND THEIR SENSE OF
PATRIOTISM FRUSTRATED BY AN OBLIGATION THAT THEIR PRIVATE
INTERESTS NOT BE JEOPARDIZED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE HEAD OF A
LARGE AMERICAN COMPANY AND FORMER CABINET MEMBER RECENTLY
TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT ANY COMPANY WAS OUT OF ITS MIND
TO COOPERATE WITH CIA AS LONG AS THE PROVISIONS OF THE

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FOIA APPLY TO IT. I THINK HE IS ABSOLUTELY WRONG, BUT AGAIN

IT IS IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS HIS PERCEPTION, NOT OURS, THAT

COUNTS. UNFORTUNATELY, HE IS NOT ALONE. OVER THE PAST

FEW YEARS THIS DILEMMA HAS PROMPTED OTHER IMPORTANT U.S.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION TO DISCONTINUE THEIR COOPERATION

WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE.

ONCE AGAIN, THIS REACTION CANNOT BE LAID ENTIRELY AT
FOIA'S DOORSTEP, BUT IT IS THE PRINCIPAL SYMBOL TO MOST.
THESE EXAMPLES DEMONSTRATE THE CHILLING EFFECT THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT HAS HAD ON OUR ABILITY TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE. MR. CHAIRMAN, WE ARE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE THE BEST
POSSIBLE INFORMATION TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS AND THE CONGRESS.
WE ARE SERIOUSLY HAMPERED IN ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE UNLESS
WE CAN GIVE MORE CERTAIN GUARANTEES TO OUR SOURCES THAT THEIR
INFORMATION WILL BE HELD INVIOLATE.

LET ME POINT TO ANOTHER ASPECT. AS THIS COMMITTEE WELL KNOWS, THE VAST MAJORITY OF CIA INFORMATION IS PROPERLY SECRET AND EFFORTS TO EXCISE THESE SECRETS FROM DOCUMENTS NOT ONLY INVOLVE THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE PERCEPTION OF THE RISK OF DISCLOSURE WHICH I HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED, BUT ALSO PRODUCES INFORMATION, MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, OUT OF CONTEXT AND THEREFORE MISLEADING AND EXTREMELY SMALL IN COMPARISON TO THE ACTUAL QUANTITY REVIEWED. OF COURSE, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT A SOPHISTICATED FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

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COULD PIECE TOGETHER, FROM THE BITS AND PIECES OF RELEASED

INFORMATION, A LARGER PORTION OF THE ENTIRE PICTURE REGARDING
A PARTICULAR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY OR OPERATION.

MR. CHAIRMAN, MY PRESENTATION TO YOU WOULD BE INCOMPLETE

IF I LEFT YOU WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOLE PROBLEM CREATED

BY THE SUBJECTION OF OUR RECORDS TO THE FOIA WAS ONE OF PERCEPTION.

FOIA PROCESSING IS, OF COURSE, CARRIED OUT BY HUMAN BEINGS. THIS

RAISES THE POSSIBILITY OF HUMAN ERROR AND OF FAULTY JUDGMENT

AS TO WHAT MAY AND WHAT MAY NOT BE RELEASED IN ONE OR ANOTHER

SITUATION. MISTAKES, ALTHOUGH FEW AND FAR BETWEEN, HAVE BEEN

MADE AND WILL, I FEAR, CONTINUE TO OCCUR NO MATTER HOW MUCH CARE

WE EXERT IN PROCESSING REQUESTS.

ADDITIONALLY, AND PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY FOIA REQUESTS
BREAK DOWN THE CIA'S SYSTEM OF COMPARTMENTED RECORDS. OUR
COMPARTMENTED RECORDS SYSTEM ALLOWS ONLY THOSE WITH A GENUINE
NEED TO KNOW TO HAVE ACCESS TO ONE OR ANOTHER DOCUMENT OR FILE.
UNDER AN FOIA REQUEST ALL RECORDS AND FILES RELEVANT TO THE
PARTICULAR REQUEST ARE DRAWN TOGETHER. THEY REMAIN TOGETHER
DURING THE FOIA REQUEST, APPEAL AND LITIGATION PROCESS THUS
GIVING THEM FAR WIDER DISTRIBUTION THAN THEY WOULD NORMALLY
HAVE AND THAN IS CONSISTENT WITH GOOD SECURITY PRACTICE.
THUS WE FIND THE ANOMALY THAT FOIA IS GIVEN A RANK OF
IMPORTANCE HIGHER THAN THE NEED TO KNOW PRINCIPLE WHICH IS
THE UNDERPINNING OF OUR INFORMATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM.

AS I STATED, OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERN WITH THE FOIA IS
THE CHILLING EFFECT IT HAS ON OUR SOURCES.

BEFORE CLOSING, HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU EXAMPLES OF SOME OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS WE FACE IN ENDEAVORING TO COMPLY WITH THE ACT.

- -- IN SPITE OF THE DEVOTION OF INCREASED MANPOWER COUPLED WITH EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY WE CONTINUE TO RECEIVE A HEAVIER VOLUME OF FOIA AND PRIVACY ACT REQUESTS THAN WE CAN HANDLE. IN THIS REGARD WE RECEIVE OVER 4,100 FOIA, PA AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12065 REQUESTS PER YEAR OR ABOUT 16 PER DAY. OUR CURRENT BACKLOG IS OVER 2,700 UNANSWERED REQUESTS.
- -- WE HAVE MANY DIFFERENT RECORD SYSTEMS, AS MANY AS

  21 OF WHICH MAY HAVE TO BE SEARCHED IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO

  A PARTICULAR FOIA REQUEST. THESE DIVERGENT RECORD SYSTEMS,

  AS I NOTED EARLIER, MUST BE SEPARATELY MAINTAINED BECAUSE

  OF THE COMPARTMENTED SECURITY SYSTEM WHICH WE FIND ESSENTIAL.
  - -- THE AVERAGE COST OF PROCESSING REQUESTS AMOUNTS TO \$800 EACH.
  - -- MANY OF OUR REQUESTS ARE SENT TO US VIA A FORM LETTER.

    FOR EXAMPLE, REQUESTS RECEIVED FROM UNIVERSITIES OFTEN FOLLOW

    THIS PATTERN AND GENERALLY SPEAKING ARE EXTREMELY BROAD, ASKING

    FOR "ALL INFORMATION CIA HAS ON RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CIA AND

    THE UNIVERSITY AND CIA AND UNIVERSITY STAFF OR OFFICIALS."
    - -- OTHER REQUESTS ARE OF THE CURIOSITY VARIETY. TO MOST

OF THESE WE ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE DOCUMENTS BUT MUST, NONETHELESS, EXPEND MANY FRUITLESS MANHOURS IN ARRIVING AT THAT CONCLUSION.

- -- MANY ARE FROM FOREIGNERS -- POSSIBLY REPRESENTATIVES OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND CLEARLY SOME FROM THOSE WHOSE APPARENT PURPOSE IN WRITING IS TO UNCOVER INFORMATION WHICH WOULD DO HARM TO THIS NATION'S INTERESTS OVERSEAS.
- -- A NUMBER ARE FROM INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS. IN ONE CASE WE HAVE DEVOTED THE TOTAL EFFORTS OF ONE PERSON FULL-TIME FOR A PERIOD OF 17 MONTHS. THIS AGAIN IS FOR A SINGLE REQUEST BY ONE INDIVIDUAL.
- -- IN ANOTHER AREA, WE HAVE ALREADY EXPENDED APPROXIMATELY
  FOUR MAN-YEARS ON ANSWERING FOIA REQUESTS FROM PHILLIP AGEE WHO,
  AS NOTED EARLIER, IS AN ADMITTED ADVERSARY OF THE CIA DEDICATED
  TO EXPOSING THE IDENTITIES OF OUR EMPLOYEES SERVING OVERSEAS.
  HE DOES THIS THROUGH THE VEHICLE OF THIS PUBLICATION. THE COVERT
  ACTION BULLETIN. IT IS DISGRACEFUL THAT WE SHOULD BE ASKED TO
  ASSIST HIM IN HIS ENDEAVORS.

DURING 1978 WE SPENT 116 MAN-YEARS WORKING ON REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION UNDER THE DISCLOSURE STATUTES. BY COMPARISON THIS EXPENDITURE OF VALUABLE HUMAN RESOURCES IS GREATER THAN THAT SPENT ON ANY ONE OF SEVERAL AREAS OF KEY INTELLIGENCE INTEREST TO TH UNITED STATES.

THUS MR. CHAIRMAN, THE BURDEN OF THE FOIA IS ALSO A PROBLEM FOR US AND ONE, WHEN COUPLED WITH THE MORE SERIOUS PROBLEMS I

DESCRIBED EARLIER, IN NEED OF REMEDY. THAT REMEDY IS DIFFICULT TO FASHION AND WE HAVE GIVEN IT A LOT OF THOUGHT. WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE GENERAL FOI CONCEPT. WE DO NOT SEEK A TOTAL EXEMPTION FROM FOIA. WHAT WE REALLY SEEK IS A MORE EFFECTIVE WAY TO INSURE OUR SOURCES THAT WE ARE DOING WHAT THE 1949 CIA ENABLING ACT DIRECTS US TO DO, THAT IS, PROTECT THEM. WE THINK WE CAN ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE, AT LEAST PARTIALLY, BY PERFECTING THE RELEVANT CIA ACT PROVISIONS IN A MANNER FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTIONS ALREADY IN THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT. AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE COMPETING NEEDS OF OUR U.S. CITIZENS WHOSE SUPPORT AND CONFIDENCE WE MUST MAINTAIN. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE BELIEVE THAT OUR FILES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ACCESSIBLE TO AMERICAN CITIZENS AND PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIENS, SUBJECT TO EXISTING FOIA EXEMPTIONS, TO THE EXTENT THAT INFORMATION CONCERNING SUCH PERSONS MAY BE CONTAINED IN OUR FILES.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WHILE I AM NOT A CAREER INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,
I HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH INTELLIGENCE FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS AS
A FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER. AFTER ONE YEAR IN MY CURRENT POSITION,
I CAN TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT THE EROSION OF OUR ABILITY TO
PROTECT OUR SOURCES AND METHODS, AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE
LARGER THAN LIFE PERCEPTION OF THAT EROSION IS THE MOST SERIOUS
PROBLEM THE CIA FACES TODAY. IF WE DO NOT SOLVE IT WE CANNOT
CONTINUE TO BE THE BEST INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD.

ACCEPT SOME SECRECY. FOIA HAS CALLED INTO QUESTION AROUND
THE WORLD OUR ABILITY TO KEEP A SECRET. ITS APPLICATION IN
ITS CURRENT FORM TO CIA IS INAPPROPRIATE, UNNECESSARY IN
LIGHT OF CURRENT OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS, AND HARMFUL. I URGE
THAT THE COMMITTEE WORK WITH US TO FRAME THE MODIFICATIONS
THAT WILL HELP SOLVE THE PROBLEMS I HAVE OUTLINED TODAY.